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switch wrote:If you are not engaging in self-defense 24-7, you are crazy. I guess I am not engaging in self-defense when I am in White, when I have a defensive perimeter.

You carry a gun because you might find something to shoot when you hunt. I carry a gun because I might need to shoot someone/something for self-defense. You have to carry a gun 100% of the time while hunting because you might need it. You have to carry a gun 100% because you might need it for self-defense.

The fact that said need in a PO is statistically minor is irrelevant. Actually, it is pretty insignificant everywhere I go. If it was not, I would not go there.

Is it legal to carry in a PO? Yes! Could I prove that in a court of law? Probably not. Could I afford to litigate it? Definitely not. There are a lot of acts that were deemed illegal until the USSC said the law was unconstitutional. Many of those laws were not as ambiguous as the phrase 'incident to other legal activity'.

I think we can all agree that self-defense is a legal activity. In fact, it is legal to use a gun for self-defense in many areas where it is illegal to have a gun - and usually, you are not prosecuted for having it there. I think most of us here would agree that having a gun is preferable for self-defense.

I recognize that most federal LEO and fed prosecutors would not agree w/me.

At the risk of beating a dead horse...any discussion concerning carrying a handgun in a post office because of hunting, self-defense, or any other lawful purpose is irrelevant. When you are prosecuted for carrying a weapon in a post office the prosecutor will only have to prove these things...
1. that the device was a firearm, dangerous or deadly weapon, or an explosive
2. that the actor did carry the device while on postal property, or store it on postal property
3. that the device was carried openly or concealed
4. that the actor did so while not for official purposes.
5. that, if challenged by defense, there are no other superseding or governing applicable regulations or statutes relevant to the issue before the court

39 CFR 232.1(l) Weapons and explosives. No person while on postal property may carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, or store the same on postal property, except for official purposes. and 39 USC 410

Not once will the prosecutor deal with the act from the standpoint of self-defense. The subject wont come up except by your defense attorney as he struggles to come up with some reason to try to get you acquitted. Once the prosecutor has proven those 5 points he has proven his case against you, that being, that you violated 39 CFR 232.1(l) (he wont even ask you if you were hunting!)

The rule concerning carrying at a post office is cut and dried. 18USC930 is also as it concerns carrying at general federal facilities.

Everytime someone starts to mention self-defense, hunting, or some other lawful purpose as a reason to carry at a post office they should pause and say to themselves "oooops, wrong discussion".

tex

ps. The good thing about this discussion is that we all will be much more expert at what the rules state than when we began.

I apologize for what must be confusion on my part. I understand that people want to use 930 to argue their position that carrying in a post office is or should be or ought to be or wish it could be legal. And I understand why there is confusion since a post office is a federal facility. I guess I must be missing something. I thought we have (or should have) long since moved on from that argument since 232 is clear and 410 insulates 232 from the effects of 930.

I also, I believe, understand that some people don't get that. It seems that 930 should have no place in a 232 discussion other than to explain why 930 doesn't apply since it is only confusing to many. If people want to debate carrying a firearm into a federal building such as a veterans administration building or social security office then we can get into 930's hunting, other lawful purposes, and being incident thereto.

It seems that after 14 pages of replies we are still discussing post offices as if they are governed by 930.

By the way, regarding 930, it has occurred to me that one point of confusion due to terms might be this...while carrying a handgun may be a legal activity or a legal privilege, can that, in and of itself, be defined as a legal purpose (for application to 930). In other words, I may be able to carry a gun legally but do I have a legally acceptable purpose for legally carrying my gun? But then I ask myself can't the same be said for a hunting rifle? Of course, it can. So we go back to the word 'other'. Clearly 'hunting' is considered a purpose as there are 'other' lawful purposes implied. The rule could have just as easily been written '...firearms and other dangerous weapons incident to any lawful purpose including hunting' which could have been further distilled to '...incident to any lawful purpose.' Whatever it is about hunting that makes hunting a lawful purpose is the same test we must apply to other lawful purposes else logic fails. That bears
repeating...whatever legal characteristic about the activity of hunting makes it a lawful purpose, that same characteristic must be applied to other activities to qualify them as a lawful purpose in the mechanism of this statute.

Respectfully, I seem to be getting confused about the debate since there have been examples given like how a handgun has nothing to do with buying stamps...as if a hunting rifle does...in a debate about post offices which are governed by a rule that has nothing to do with hunting or being incident to hunting. I know there has been plenty of effort to untangle 232 and 930.

Maybe we can start over. You cannot carry in a post office....period, 232. No, 930 has nothing to do with post offices since 410 says 930 has nothing to do with post offices. Isn't it really that simple.

Tex

You guys are getting 232 mixed up with 930 again. The post office has it's own rule superseding 930 covering general federal facilities. You can't carry a firearm into a post office and it has nothing to do with being incident to hunting which is found only and applicable to general federal facilities. There is really nothing to debate about post offices. 232 is clear.

Tex

Charles L. Cotton wrote:

thetexan wrote:I know that but Im not aware (doesnt mean it hasnt happened) that that part of the statute has been tried and appealed to determine what the appellate ruling on what the interpretation of 'other lawful purposes' is.

tex

Apparently my comments have been misunderstood. I'm not saying the only exception is related to hunting. The plain language of the statue requires that the firearm be "incident to" some "other lawful activity." Hunting is expressly cited in the statute as an exception with the phrase "incident to hunting or other lawful activity." That's why I use hunting as an example of the firearm being incident to (a/k/a required in order to conduct the activity) the "other lawful activity."

The most common theory I hear in an attempt to apply this exception to a CHL carrying in a post office is that carrying a handgun is "incident to self-defense." Being armed means we are prepared to defend ourselves if necessary, but we are engaged in the act of self-defense until we are attacked and are dealing with our assailant. A gun is not a required tool to walk into a post office to buy stamps, mail a package or check a post office box, so it is not "incident to" any of those action. Since we are not under attack, then we are not engaged in self-defense, thus the firearm is not "incident to lawful self-defense."

I wish the express language of the statute was otherwise, but it isn't. I hope a court will rule that the exception is broader than the language of the statute, but until that day comes, I'll still tell every one of my CHL students that it is unlawful to carry in a Post Office.

Chas.

Thank you Charles for the vigorous debate,

I, like you, will still tell my students that the post office is prohibited. My main argument in my first two posts on this subject dealt with federal facilities. I didnt really address post offices since I believe the post office statute supersedes the federal facility statute as it pertains to the post office as a federal facility. This debate is really academic but is a useful learning tool for everyone who wishes to dissect statutes, their interpretation and application. You stated that the carriage of a concealed handgun is not incident to buying stamps or other post office activity. Nor is a hunting rifle incident to buying stamps. But here again we are cross pollinating between two different statutes...18USC930 which applies to federal facilities in general and 39USC410 which deals with post offices exempts them from the provisions of 39USC410. This allows 39CFR232 to have supersedence over 930.

The confusion for many, I believe, is the attempt to stuff the square 39CFR232 post office peg into the round 18USC930 federal facility hole. If we stick with 930 it is clear interpretively and contextually that to whatever degree and relationship 'incident to' has to 'hunting' is the same degree and relationship 'incident to' has to 'other lawful activities'. If one can carry a hunting rifle into a federal facility because it use is incident to hunting then I can carry a concealed handgun because it is incident to self-defense. In both cases, hunting and self-defense, reference future activities and do not occur at the time of the carriage into the facility. Even if we deal with apples and oranges such as 232 and 930 and assume the argument, regarding a post office, that a hunting rifle is ok due to its incidence to hunting we could also argue that it, however, has no incidence to buying stamps. The same logic would apply to any other lawful purpose such as wearing a concealed handgun for the purpose of, say, target practice. My privilege of carrying a concealed handgun does not compel me to carry it for any particular reason. I might carry it because I need something on the right side of my belt as a counterweight for the iphone on the left side of my belt. Carrying for a counterweight is another lawful purpose, therefore it is incident to that other lawful purpose. But there is no requirement that the purpose be instant. As with carrying a hunting rifle for a purpose that is obviously to take place at some time either past or future, it is certainly not intended to be incident to hunting NOW while in the post office. Nor is a concealed handgun incident to any lawful purpose which will occur NOW while in the post office. It too, was or will be incident to some past or future lawful purpose. Unless of course, a madman opens fire while in the post office then the purpose becomes NOW in the present. Enough of the hypothetical of applying 930 to post offices. Let's go back to separating 232 from 930 with 410 as the referee.

In 930 we have two identical, and I mean IDENTICAL, purposes...hunting and other lawful. Whatever applies to one applies to the other. Or, else, they would have to somehow be found to be different parametrically and characteristically. I have laid out my reasoning why I believe they are not in the previous posts. Therefore, even though I do not have the funds to become a test subject, I firmly believe that for whatever reason I am allowed to carry a firearm or dangerous weapon incident to hunting into a federal facility, I am also, for the exact same reason, allowed to carry that same firearm or dangerous weapon into a federal facility because it is incident to any other lawful activity, self-defense (which as I pointed out earlier, Congress defined specifically as a lawful activity in other code not specific to the section in which it is found), paper weight, counter weights, target shooting, demonstrations and the like.

That's 930 and general federal facilities.

39CFR232 is another animal and the argument there is utterly simple. It prohibits explosives, firearms and other dangerous weapons on to postal property.......period. And 410 makes it unreachable and superior to 930.

I believe we all know better than to test our theories in this area. But these mind exercises make us better readers and interpreters of the statutes that govern us. By the way, what a great service you have provided with this forum and your work with gun legislation.

Thank you,
tex

I know that but Im not aware (doesnt mean it hasnt happened) that that part of the statute has been tried and appealed to determine what the appellate ruling on what the interpretation of 'other lawful purposes' is.

tex

switch wrote:That seems to be plain english. "other legal purpose" would included CC w/CHL. However, current interpretation ties it to hunting. I do not agree w/that interpretation. I think a law should be clear and any ambiguity should be decided in favor of the defendant. ( I always heard that a tie goes to the runner in baseball.) However, I do not have the resource to contest this and do not like the consequences if I lose.

I feel the same way about the discussion where carrying concealed w/a CHL also means you can carry an 'illegal' knife'.

When you say the current interpretation ties it to hunting; what do you mean? Who's interpretation? This forum's?
Here is what I would do if I wanted to research it further...
1. Look for case law (appellate rulings) on cases where this statute was challenged or was a part of a trial.
2. Look for any other type of statute where 'other lawful purpose' or 'lawful purpose' is used, particularly written by the same legislative body and subject to a common appellate review, then apply #1 above to that.

An appellate court has no choice but to rule on the application of the law to the elements of the statute. That is where 'other lawful purposes' will be determined.

I just thought of another example. What if I use my CHL conceal carry priveleges to carry my gun to a legal target sporting match. The concealed carriage of a handgun does not have to be for the purpose of self-defense. I can use the privilege to simply transport my gun to a gun auction, or a gunsmith, or a target match. I can even carry a gun and be against using a gun in self-defense. The CHL simply allows the licensee to carry a pistol on his person in a concealed manner for whatever 'lawful purpose'.

And that is the logic that one would have to overcome to prove that 'other lawful purpose' DOES NOT apply to CHL carriage. What if the rule stated...'(3) the lawful carrying of paint brushes in a Federal facility incident to painting a home or other lawful purposes'

Would anyone with reasonable logical analytical ability not conclude that 'other lawful purposes' refers to any lawful purpose to which a paint brush can be used other than painting a house...nevermind the interpretive analysis I gave in my long response?

Let's take a test. Which of the following rules is not the same as the rest?

1. '(3) the lawful carrying of paint brushes in a Federal facility incident to painting a home or other lawful purposes'
2. '(3) the lawful carrying of ball point pens in a Federal facility incident to writing a novel or other lawful purposes'
3. '(3) the lawful carrying of cell phones in a Federal facility incident to making phone calls or other lawful purposes'
4. '(3) the lawful carrying of credit cards in a Federal facility incident to buying lunches or other lawful purposes'
5. (3) the lawful carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a Federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes
6. '(3) the lawful carrying of briefcases in a Federal facility incident to carrying legal briefs or other lawful purposes'

In each of these the usage referred to as 'incident to' is only one of many possible lawful usages. Would anyone conclude that in (2) above that any ball point pen carried into a federal facility would only qualify if it somehow was only involved in some form or novel writing???

What about (6) above? Would a man be arrested for having a peanut butter sandwich in his briefcase?

Let's look at it from the other direction. Suppose I gave you a legal dictionary and could pour 20 years of legislative statute writing and experience into your brain and gave you this task...write a statute that prohibits the carrying of a firearm or dangerous weapon into a federal facility unless the gun is used only for hunting related purposes. What would you write? Let me start you off with the beginning of the sentence...

(d) Subsection (a) shall not apply to—
'(3) the lawful carrying of firearms or dangerous weapons in a Federal facility... (insert language here)

What would you write? There are lots of possibilities depending on your level of articulation but let's consider a few.

1. ...used for hunting.
2. ...incident to hunting.
3. ...used only for hunting. (let's throw in an adverb for good measure)
4. ...incident only to hunting.
5. ...used for hunting or other hunting purposes.
6. ...incident to lawful killing of legal game.

Which of these is has the clearest meaning if your meaning is to restrict a gun to those only used for the purpose of hunting? Now take this same list and let's add one other.

1. ...used for hunting.
2. ...incident to hunting.
3. ...used only for hunting. (let's throw in an adverb for good measure)
4. ...incident to hunting and other lawful purposes.
5. ...incident only to hunting.
6. ...used for hunting or other hunting purposes.
7. ...incident to lawful killing of legal game.

Now. Which one of these has the most confusing and convoluting language if you're intent is to convey that only guns necessary for hunting may be carried into a federal facility? I submit to you that 1000 out of 1000 reasonably educated persons will pick number 4. Why would a legislator include the extraneous phrase 'or other lawful purposes' if his intent was to restrict it to just activities incident or necessary for hunting when so many other phrases are much more concise and to the point? Clearly, and under the guidence of statutory interpretation, we can assume that Congress is trying to tell us something; that Congress knows how to mean what it says and say what it means. Clearly Congress has a reason for adding the phrase.

Here are some examples elsewhere in the US Code that uses mutually similar language...

USC Title 15 Commerce and Trade §7901 Findings; purposes §7901 (b) The purpose of this chapter are as follows: (2) To preserve a citizen's access to a supply of firearms and ammunition for all lawful purposes, including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and competitive or recreational shooting. [Note the use of the word 'including' and that the enumerated list is not of one class involving just those associated with hunting. This list also includes such non-hunting things as collecting, and competitive shooting...even self-defense!]

USC Title 47—TELECOMMUNICATIONS §254. Universal service (5) (D) Disabling during adult use An administrator, supervisor, or other person authorized by the certifying authority under subparagraph (A)(i) may disable the technology protection measure concerned, during use by an adult, to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose.

Now let's review some universally accepted canons of statutory interpretation, and particularly those accepted and used by the Supreme Court of the United States. The following are quoted from the report prepared for members and committees of Congress by the Congressional Research Service.

Statutory Interpretation:
General Principles and Recent Trends

Summary
"The Supreme Court has expressed an interest “that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.” This report identifies and describes some of the more important rules and conventions of interpretation that the Court applies. Although this report focuses primarily on the Court’s methodology in construing statutory text, the Court’s approach to reliance on legislative history are also briefly described."

...The Court frequently relies on “canons” of construction to draw inferences
about the meaning of statutory language...

Statutory Text
In General — Statutory Context and Purpose
The starting point in statutory construction is the language of the statute itself. The Supreme Court often recites the “plain meaning rule,” that, if the language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look outside the statute to its legislative history in order to ascertain the statute’s meaning.

Ordinary meaning and dictionary definitions.
Words that are not terms of art and that are not statutorily defined are customarily given their ordinary meanings, often derived from the dictionary.

And/or.
Ordinarily, as in everyday English, use of the conjunctive “and” in a list means that all of the listed requirements must be satisfied,33 while use of the disjunctive “or” means that only one of the listed requirements need be satisfied.

Statutory Language Not to be Construed as “Mere Surplusage”
A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the
language it employed.” [This is the Congress says what it means and means what it says rule]

Above we have two examples, Title 15 and Title 47 where the same legislative body, Congress, albeit not the same session, uses the term 'all lawful purposes' and 'other lawful purpose' with contextually clear, and mutually applicable way. Congress clearly knows the meaning and proper and customary usage of the term 'lawful purpose'; it has used it at least twice...three times if you include 18USC§930. The court must give effect to the phrase 'other lawful purpose' in §930 and the word 'or' is used disjunctively to indicate that either 'incident to hunting' or 'other lawful purposes' need be satisfied to qualify under the exception in §930.

In 15USC§7901 there is no intra-paragraph defining of the phrase 'all lawful purposes' similar to, say, Texas PC §30.06 where we find in paragraph (c) In this section:(1) Entry has the meaning assigned by Section 30.05(b). Here, the use and meaning of the word 'entry' is defined for its specific use in this specific section. This is not the case in 15USC§7901 so it appears that 'all lawful purposes' takes on its common meaning and usage. This is further reinforced by the context of the enumerated examples following the phrase. We can further conclude that since 'all lawful purposes' takes a common usage and meaning that the examples that follow the phrase beginning with the word 'including' serve to do exactly that...give examples of the meaning of the phrase 'all lawful purposes' as used in this context. Notice also that the word 'including' is not necessarily exclusive nor necessarily limit the extent of 'all' lawful purposes to just hunting, self-defense, collecting, and competitive or recreational shooting.

Let me ask the question again...would a man carrying a firearm into a federal facility for the purpose of going to a competitive shoot (a future event and usage, by the way) be excepted under §930? What about someone carrying a concealed handgun for self-defense?

That's the way I see it for what it's worth,

tex

Charles L. Cotton wrote: ... The subpart (c) exception to the general rule against carrying firearms in federal facilities applies to firearms that are "incident to" lawful hunting or other lawful purposes. We can replace the words "incident to" with "necessary for" and you get a clearer picture.

Firearms are required for hunting (except bow season) unless you are really really fast and can run down your prey and stab it, so they are "incident to" lawful hunting. The same cannot be said for a CHL carrying in a post office. Having a gun on your side is not "incident to" any other lawful purpose such as buying stamps, shipping a package, checking a PO box, or anything else you're going to do in a post office. Some have argued that you are carrying it "incident to" lawful self-defense, but this argument fails because you are not engaged in self-defense when you walk into a Post Office. You are prepared to engage in self-defense if attacked, but you are not engaged in the act of self-defense when you enter the post office. The only way 18 U.S.C. 930(c) would apply is if you are attacked and flee into a PO with your handgun. Then you are actively engaged in the lawful act of self-defense.

The best argument will be Heller's recognition of the Second Amendment as an individual right and its dicta noting that self-defense is a natural and constitutionally protected right.

There is a great lesson for all activists; don't overstate our case and don't exaggerate the opposition's position. Doing so not only deceives "our people," it hurts our credibility to the vast majority of Americans who are not members of the NRA or the Brady Campaign. I have won a lot of trials because I caught a witness in a lie or an exaggeration. Once you show a jury they can't be trusted, you've taken a giant step toward winning the case, even if the facts are less than favorable for your client.

Chas.

18 U.S.C. 930(c) wrote:(d) Subsection (a) shall not apply to—
(1) the lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent, or employee of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, who is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of law;
(2) the possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a Federal official or a member of the Armed Forces if such possession is authorized by law; or
(3) the lawful carrying of firearms or other dangerous weapons in a Federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes

(Emphasis added).

My reading of the statute is this...

I agree with your translation of 'incident to' into 'necessary for'. The disjunctive use of the word or implies that there are other lawful purposes for which the carrying of a dangerous weapon in a Federal facility is possible. If one carries his rifle or hunting pistol into the post office or other federal facility the gun is certainly not necessary for the purchase of stamps or any other imaginable act! Therefore, by what reasoning does one has permission to carry a dangerous weapon by walking into a post office to buy stamps while holding his rifle which is used for hunting? What if that rifle is a target .22 not used for hunting but rather used for the lawful purpose of target shooting at the local range? Does that dangerous rifle weapon qualify under the 'other lawful purpose' exception? Because of the word 'hunting' we think of rifle, and because we think of rifle we think we need to categorize a handgun as a different 'dangerous weapon' and then we feel we are straining to find how the exception applies to the handgun.

At trial, and with particularly attention at appeal, there are, as I count, 5 elements of the exception that must be met for one to be guilty of an offense.

1. the lawful carrying of... one must know the legal definition of lawful carry, which may itself have several elements
2. firearms or other dangerous weapons...must be a firearm or dangerous weapon as defined
3. Federal facility...the act must occur at a federal facility as federal facility is defined by statute
4. the firearm or dangerous weapon in question must be incident to hunting or (disjunctive)
5. or other lawful purposes...what constitutes other lawful purposes.

My analysis is this...

It seems that the most important element requiring the most attention is the 'hunting or other lawful purposes' phrase. The disjunctive use of the word 'or' clearly, by context, separates the two types of 'purposes'. When interpreting statutes one principle is the (ejusdem generis) 'of the same class or nature' rule. For example, what if I say "only pastry chefs, candy makers, sweet roll bakers, cookie bakers, or other persons involved in the preparation of food may attend the conference." And a grill cook wants to attend but is turned away and wants to know why. The statutory interpretation would be that the enumeration of 'pastry chefs, candy makers, sweet roll bakers, cookie bakers' establish a class or acceptable nature which is common to the enumerated list. A grill cook is not among that class and even though he is involved in the preparation of food he is not invited because a class of acceptable attendees has been established and a grill cook in not one of those.

But we dont have that here. We have only one enumerated item prior to the disjunctive 'or'. That could not be thought of as being establishing a class or nature alone. It would be most likely interpreted as being 'either this or that'. However, the two work together in harmony to establish and then reinforce an acceptable class. The key word is 'other'. 'Other' implies a reference to another item. The sentence would not make sense of it read '...incident to other lawful purposes' and left out 'hunting'. 'Other' points to and gets is meaning from some other item and that item is hunting' The phrase, therefore, connects the words 'lawful purpose' with the word 'hunting' with the word 'other'. The sentence could just as easily read, '...incident to hunting or incident to other lawful purposes'.

So clearly there are other lawful purposes in existence that the carrying of firearms or dangerous weapons is incident to that would allow them in a federal facility under the exception.

Because of the 'this or that' nature of the phrase 'hunting or other lawful purposes'. What if the sentence read, 'hunting or other purposes'? It could further be expanded to read, 'hunting purposes or other purposes.' But we have the adjective 'lawful' modifying the word purpose. The connector 'other' attributes whatever characteristic is meant by the word 'lawful' to the word 'hunting'. In other words, there must be some characteristic of 'hunting' that is and can be described as 'lawful' that can be equally attributed to the word 'purposes' by the connecting word 'other'. We could further expand the phrase to read 'incident to lawful hunting purposes, or other lawful purposes.' The same can be applied to the word 'incident'. We can further expand the sentence to read, 'incident to lawful hunting purposes or incident to other lawful purposes.'

Why is the carriage of a hunting rifle in a federal facility permissible? By definition, because it is incident to hunting, not to buying stamps or mailing a package. In fact the 'hunting' to which the gun is incident to is a future event and will not be carried out (hopefully) at the federal facility. Sometime in the future there will be a hunting event for which the firearm or dangerous weapon is excepted. Now, any other lawful purpose could be defended on the idea that for whatever purpose IT is incident to is also a future event. In analyzing the situation we must ask this question...

1. Must the man carrying the hunting rifle be purposefully on his way to a hunt for the rifle to meet the element of 'incident to' in the statute? A spoon is a utensil incident to the eating of a meal, a hairbrush is an item incident to combing one's hair, a basketball if a piece of equipment incident to playing a game of basketball. Certainly, if the definition of 'incident to' can be translated to 'necessary for'. The purpose of a seat belt is to protect the driver but only in one situation...when the driver, for some reason, is caused to leave his position in the driver's seat due to adverse physical forces. The seat belt retains the driver in the seat and thus protects him. The seat belt can thus be said to be 'incident to' or 'necessary for' the protection of the driver in a crash. In this case the seat belt's purpose is for some future event and will be incident to that future event. Must the seat belt be presently engaged in the protection of the driver to be serving its purpose? What is the seat belt doing during the rest of the time as it lays fastened around your lap. It is not protecting you until the dreaded crash. What do we call what it is doing now? It is serving as prophylactic capacity against some possible future need.
It is no more protecting NOW than a hunting rifle is hunting NOW.

Nor, I might add, is a legally concealed handgun protecting NOW.

What is the purpose of the hunting rifle? To be used in a future hunt. If we try to say that carrying a handgun is also excepted then what is its future, lawful purpose? The answer is to legally defend against a qualified future threat as legally authorized by Texas statute. So does this act qualify as a lawful purpose? The use of the handgun to defend will either be....lawful.....or unlawful. There will be no other possibility. It's use will either be statutorily lawful or statutorily unlawful. If statutorily lawful, then what more must an act do to qualify as a lawful purpose, to satisfy the 'lawful purpose' element in the statute? What all must the hunter carrying his rifle do to qualify for the exception that to carry a firearm or dangerous weapon that is incident to hunting. Must he also carry a hunting license? Must he have on his person a reservation receipt to a hunting lease? Must he be dressed for and prepared for the hunt? Must he answer the question "are you on your way to or from a hunting trip" in the affirmative? Or can he simply state that he carries it in case he runs across a deer somewhere?

Under the statutory interpretation canon the legislature means what it says and says what it means my reading of this is that the 20 words in the exception are clear and easily interpreted.

As it pertains to 18USC 930, federal facilities.

The statute covering post offices is separate, pertains uniquely to post offices and states in 39USC 410...
§ 410. Application of other laws
Release date: 2003-06-24
(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, and except as otherwise provided in this title or insofar as such laws remain in force as rules or regulations of the Postal Service, no Federal law dealing with public or Federal contracts, property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or funds, including the provisions of chapters 5 and 7 of title 5, shall apply to the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service.

So while an argument can be made for generic federal facilities, my feeling is that the post office statute is clear in its prohibition of firearms at postal facilities. We can only hope that the 10th circuit upholds the decision against the Avon Post office in Colorado and then it will apply in the 10th district. It will be a short course to the SCOTUS to apply it nationwide.

As sure of myself in my interpretation as I am, I would not try this simply because it would bankrupt me to prove the point at the appeals level. And I have other fish to fry.

That's the way I see it, for what it's worth,
tex