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The most recent issue of the Force Science News identifies what some researchers believe is a significant potential unintended discharge hazard from the use of the type of handgun mounted flashlight switch involved in this incident. The article mentions this event specifically along with others. It sheds new and more complex light on what may have happened in this instance, and what could happen again to others.

The gist of the article is that research shows that under stress, even persons trained to keep their fingers outside the trigger guard until a decision to fire has been made may in fact put a finger on the trigger during a fast breaking incident. This circumstance, combined with the intentional squeezing of the middle finger to activate a flashlight switch may in some cases cause a sympathetic contraction of the trigger finger with enough pressure to fire the gun. This happens too quickly for the person to realize what's happening and stop it.

To avoid both this and unsafe sweeping of nontargets with a handgun, I don't use a gun mounted flashlight at all. Others may want to reevaluate whatever decisions they've made in this regard in light of this new information.

gemini wrote:Excaliber: You apparently are willing to buy both of these scenarios as presented by defense attorneys weeks or months after the incidents as factual and complete accounts of what transpired in each case. I'm not as convinced as you are, particularly with regard to the Plano case.

No Sir. I'm not willing to buy anything the PD's or the attorneys present as scenarios. Not sure where that came from.
I was simply quoting your post. The only thing I'm convinced of is that 2 suspects are dead.

Sorry, Gemini, I misunderstood the one liners on under training and over training in your post.

I don't see over training in either one. Properly conducted training increases proficiency.

From a training standpoint, I think we're more likely looking at either inadequate or incomplete training or training that didn't take combined with individual officer factors in both cases. Neither of these incidents as reported are common occurrences as they would likely be if they were directly and primarily related to equipment that is used by hundreds of thousands of officers.

gemini wrote:Excaliber:Here we have a newly issued piece of equipment that requires a different mode of operation from similar gear the officer was much more familiar with, and a light activation switch that is turned on with rearward pressure applied just under the trigger guard.

Basically under-trained with the equipment in use? Result = death of suspect.

Excaliber:In the BART case, the officer had received far more training in firing his handgun than his taser, and the taser holstering system setup on his duty rig was arranged so that both the taser and the handgun would be manipulated by the same hand. The hand functions for drawing and firing both were the same. Under the stress of a struggle, while his mental decision was to draw and fire the taser, the hand assigned to that task performed the more dominant function instilled by training - drawing and firing the handgun.

Basically over-trained with the equipment in use? Result = death of suspect.

Not sure exactly what conclusion to draw.

You apparently are willing to buy both of these scenarios as presented by defense attorneys weeks or months after the incidents as factual and complete accounts of what transpired in each case. I'm not as convinced as you are, particularly with regard to the Plano case.

There is nothing about activating the SureFire light switch under the trigger guard that is any different than establishing a standard good grip on the handgun - which should certainly be the done when in close quarters with a suspect. In fact, keeping the light off takes a conscious decision to keep one finger a bit more relaxed than it would otherwise be. Gripping the gun properly is not a cause of negligent discharge, whether there's a switch under one of the fingers around the handgun's grip or not.

Front strap mounted light switches of varying types have been in use for at least 40 years and are currently used in the top of the line Crimson Trace laser grips. They have never, to my knowledge, been alleged to have contributed to a negligent discharge before. Nothing in the information released to date indicates that there was anything special about the SureFire switch that makes it any more hazardous than the hundreds of thousands of other similar units that have been used for almost half a century.

There are two circumstances here which have not been fully explained in the information available to the public, but which may be contributing factors that would be consistent with what we've been told so far:

1. The practice of using a handgun with a mounted light as a flashlight (nonlethal) tool that causes a lethal tool (handgun) to be pointed at a person when that action may not be fully justified. This is a potentially negligent action, and it is unclear whether or not this was done, and whether or not the department in question trained its officers on this potentially hazardous use of their equipment.

2. Placing the finger on the trigger before a decision has been made to fire. If this were the case, consciously tightening one's grip on the gun to activate the light may well result in a contraction of the trigger finger as well, thus causing a negligent discharge. I could easily see this happening during a struggle. In this case, the primary cause is not the location of the light switch or the tightening of one's grip - it's the negligent act of placing the finger inside the trigger guard before firing is justified.

It's unknown whether or not the department in question trained its officers in the most basic safety practices designed to prevent negligent discharges, but I'd be really surprised if they hadn't. If an officer disregards this training in the field, he owns the results of his decisions in that regard.

Once again, I don't know anything more than has been released publicly about the Plano incident, and I surely don't know enough to draw any credible conclusions. I can only relate the published accounts to things I know through other experience and explore possible explanations that may stimulate some thought and discussion about how Forum members can avoid similar tragedies.

I suggest we stay tuned to the investigation to see how the facts shake out.

baldeagle wrote:

Excaliber wrote:Here we have a newly issued piece of equipment that requires a different mode of operation from similar gear the officer was much more familiar with, and a light activation switch that is turned on with rearward pressure applied just under the trigger guard. This switch is designed to be activated by the middle finger on the frontstrap.

My immediate reaction to this is what boneheaded idiot would think this was a good idea? Require the officer to use the exact same movement of his finger in the vicinity of the trigger to activate his light and expect the officer, under the stress of an encounter, to be able to properly perform the action every time? This is a recipe for failure, as this officer has discovered.

I thought we were so thoroughly modern these days that we employed engineers to anticipate and obviate problems like this. Sheesh.

I don't see any engineering failures here.

The switch under the trigger guard is not designed to be activated by any movement of the trigger finger. It is designed to be activated by the pressure typically exerted by the middle finger when a normal firing grip is taken on the gun. The trigger is activated by a much different and longer motion of a different finger. Both involve muscular contractions, but each is significantly different from the other and not particularly susceptible to confusion under most circumstances.

I have laser grips with the same switch positioning and have never had any issues with them. Laser grips and flashlights which use a similar activation mechanism have been around a very long time, and I have never heard of anyone confusing the two before now.

I was not there and have no way of knowing what actually happened in this incident. However, keep in mind that the flashlight switch issue was raised several days after the incident after long consultations with defense attorneys. I also am mindful of the fact that there is a long sad history of negligent discharges when folks put the trigger finger inside the trigger guard before a decision has been made to fire. Furthermore, I have trouble coming up with a way that the pistol could have fired as reported without the trigger finger being inside the trigger guard where it should not have been.

The investigation is still ongoing, and no valid conclusions can be drawn at this point from the information we have. However, we can take the opportunity to examine a number of ways such an incident could happen and take steps to eliminate risks from our own gun handling practices.

For my own purposes, at this time I see no significant ND risk from either a laser or flashlight activation switch on the front of the grip just beneath the trigger guard as long as the basic rules of gun safety are being observed. In police work, Rule 3 (finger outside the trigger guard and alongside the frame until a decision has been made to fire) is especially important, because Rule 1 must sometimes be violated during confrontations with potentially violent suspects. In those cases, a gun may need to be pointed at a suspect when firing on him might be necessary in another second or two, but a final decision to do so has not yet been made. This narrows the margin of safety significantly..

chartreuse wrote:

Excaliber wrote:I don't personally believe that a street wise bad guy is going to buy that he's being approached by an 8 foot tall cop holding a flashlight in front of him when an officer uses the "high and to the left" light technique. He's going to do what they teach in prison: Aim 2 1/2 feet below and 18 inches to the left of the oncoming light.

I'd not heard this before (unsurprisingly, never having been in prison) but my first thought (being a southpaw) is that received "wisdom" like this might put left-handed officers at an advantage, as their COM would be 3 feet away from the bad guy's POA. I wonder whether there are any statistics, or even anecdotal evidence, to support this supposition.

You're exactly right that the bad guy countermeasure is based on the majority of LEO's they face being right handed. A left handed LEO would indeed have an advantage there - but I'm not left handed.

The other seldom discussed issue with the "high and to the left - or right" technique is that it's really easy to hold the flashlight just a little too far back so the side spill from the light dimly illuminates the front of your body - thereby completely negating the "where is he" effect it tries to achieve.

Try it in a dark room with someone watching you from the front to see this in action.

All this is just way more complexity than I'm willing to try to manage in a critical situation. I'll stick with my Harries technique, flick the light on and off to see what I need to, and either shoot and move, or just move and repeat as necessary - from behind cover if possible.

Oldgringo wrote:

Excaliber wrote:

Oldgringo wrote:The two-handed room sweep motion places the gun in the COM - your COM. why would you want to light up the BG's target with a gun mounted beacon?

BTW, IANAL or a LEO or a Batman aspirant. I'm just an older guy trying to get along with everybody (well, almost everybody) and live out my days in harmony with nature and my SA 1911 LW Compact.

There are differing schools of thought on this.

I don't personally believe that a street wise bad guy is going to buy that he's being approached by an 8 foot tall cop holding a flashlight in front of him when an officer uses the "high and to the left" light technique. He's going to do what they teach in prison: Aim 2 1/2 feet below and 18 inches to the left of the oncoming light.

It's also physically quite difficult to coordinate using a flashlight high and off to one side of the body and shooting with the other hand. Try it some time in a force on force situation to get the feel for just how much fun this is.

I go with the "simpler is better" theory, and usually use the Harries technique with the light held parallel to the gun barrel in combination with a "flick on / shoot if needed / move quick" method. It works for me and the "non syringe" type SureFire lights I usually carry.

Your choice of flashlight will also place some limitations on the available techniques. The link above also illustrates some of the other options some folks use. Note that some techniques work best with tailcap activated lights like the Sure-Fires, and others work best with lights that have the switch on the barrel just behind the head like the Mag Lites.

I will most certainly defer to your training and experience.

Me, I'm headin' to the 'high lonesome' when the lead starts flyin'...if not sooner.

Good call.

Except for LEO's who get sent to fix the problem, that's generally the best choice - when it's available!

Oldgringo wrote:The two-handed room sweep motion places the gun in the COM - your COM. why would you want to light up the BG's target with a gun mounted beacon?

BTW, IANAL or a LEO or a Batman aspirant. I'm just an older guy trying to get along with everybody (well, almost everybody) and live out my days in harmony with nature and my SA 1911 LW Compact.

There are differing schools of thought on this.

I don't personally believe that a street wise bad guy is going to buy that he's being approached by an 8 foot tall cop holding a flashlight in front of him when an officer uses the "high and to the left" light technique. He's going to do what they teach in prison: Aim 2 1/2 feet below and 18 inches to the left of the oncoming light.

It's also physically quite difficult to coordinate using a flashlight high and off to one side of the body and shooting with the other hand. Try it some time in a force on force situation to get the feel for just how much fun this is.

I go with the "simpler is better" theory, and usually use the Harries technique with the light held parallel to the gun barrel in combination with a "flick on / shoot if needed / move quick" method. It works for me and the "non syringe" type SureFire lights I usually carry.

Your choice of flashlight will also place some limitations on the available techniques. The link above also illustrates some of the other options some folks use. Note that some techniques work best with tailcap activated lights like the Sure-Fires, and others work best with lights that have the switch on the barrel just behind the head like the Mag Lites.

gigag04 wrote:

Excaliber wrote:

gigag04 wrote:This is sad for all involved.


All the training I have recieved says that a gun light is a supplement for a handheld light. When I clear a bldg, or need to illuminate someone, I use my small streamlight, even of my weapon is drawn. Also only use my non trigger hand to activate the light (TLR-1s).

We had an email sent out about it from the train/rec dept re-emphasizing
this.

This is a far more sound practice.

When the light is mounted on the gun, there is a very strong temptation to use the gun as an illumination tool even when pointing a gun is not warranted. Sooner or later this results in the gun being pointed at things and people when there is no good reason to do so, thus inviting tragedy.

There are some situations where a light mounted gun make sense (e.g. high risk situation special response entry team), but using such a tool requires real discipline to properly manage its use under the less than ideal field conditions officers face every day.

Agree 100%. The light is there *if* I should need it in case of injury or hands being tied up. We have to complete use of force paperwork whenever we point a firearm at someone. This is where keeping the weapon at low ready comes into practice. If the suspect is an unknown threat, a weapon at the low ready will suffice.

Excellent policy and practice.

You work for a well led agency.

sjfcontrol wrote:Yeah, I wasn't really commenting about the involuntary movement. If he is doing as trained, the trigger finger will not be on the trigger anyway, when trying to turn on the light. I was thinking that when the time came to turn on the light under stress, the more natural movement (and more trained movement) would be to put the trigger finger on the trigger and pull, rather than pulling with the middle finger. Thus it is a MISTAKEN movement, not an involuntary one. His BRAIN would tell his hand to use the wrong finger, because that is the more natural and trained response. An involuntary "clench" would have no negative effect as long as his finger's not on the trigger. A mistaken "command" to the wrong finger would have disastrous effect even if the finger wasn't on the trigger at the time.

Make sense?

A hand clench that occurs when the trigger finger is alongside the trigger guard (as was taught some years ago) can cause the trigger finger to enter the trigger guard and pull the trigger.

However, the possibility you suggest does make sense and is among the plausible possibilities which have by no means been exhausted in our discussion so far. If that was what happened, it would make this case even more similar to the California incident.

The requirement to use the hand and finger movement that has been extensively trained to do one thing to execute a very similar movement to achieve a very different result with little training behind that second task certainly poses risks when the tool involved is a firearm.

sjfcontrol wrote:

Excaliber wrote:

KC5AV wrote:

Excaliber wrote:single frontstrap mounted switch option..

Wow, that seems like a spectacularly bad design.

In and of itself, I don't agree. The same switch location is used on the best Crimson Trace laser grips and other similar devices with no documented issues that I am aware of. These devices are intended to be activated by a firm grip on the handgun which does not include movement of the trigger finger.

I suspect that some combination of violations of Rules 1 and 3 and the symmetrical hand clench phenomenon are bigger factors here.

It appeared to me it was designed such that you squeeze with the trigger finger to fire, or the middle finger to turn on the light.

That's exactly correct.

However, if one's finger is on the trigger or alongside the trigger guard instead of the frame to begin with, deliberately clenching the hand to turn on the light under the stress of an arrest struggle may cause involuntary movement of the trigger finger as well.

gigag04 wrote:This is sad for all involved.


All the training I have recieved says that a gun light is a supplement for a handheld light. When I clear a bldg, or need to illuminate someone, I use my small streamlight, even of my weapon is drawn. Also only use my non trigger hand to activate the light (TLR-1s).

We had an email sent out about it from the train/rec dept re-emphasizing
this.

This is a far more sound practice.

When the light is mounted on the gun, there is a very strong temptation to use the gun as an illumination tool even when pointing a gun is not warranted. Sooner or later this results in the gun being pointed at things and people when there is no good reason to do so, thus inviting tragedy.

There are some situations where a light mounted gun make sense (e.g. high risk situation special response entry team), but using such a tool requires real discipline to properly manage its use under the less than ideal field conditions officers face every day.

KC5AV wrote:

Excaliber wrote:single frontstrap mounted switch option..

Wow, that seems like a spectacularly bad design.

In and of itself, I don't agree. The same switch location is used on the best Crimson Trace laser grips and other similar devices with no documented issues that I am aware of. These devices are intended to be activated by a firm grip on the handgun which does not include movement of the trigger finger.

I suspect that some combination of violations of Rules 1 and 3 and the symmetrical hand clench phenomenon are bigger factors here.

MojoTexas wrote:One thing to note, they never did mention if the guy was carrying heroin or not.

Even if he was, it wouldn't have constituted justification for the shoot.

MojoTexas wrote:"A Plano narcotics sergeant intended to activate a flashlight affixed to his service weapon when he accidentally pulled the trigger, fatally shooting a drug suspect in a Far North Dallas parking lot last month, the officer told investigators in this statement. "

http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/archive ... nt-to.html

The most obvious potential cause here would be having the trigger finger inside the trigger guard when grappling with a suspect. If the support hand executed a strong gripping motion, the "wiring" of the human nervous system makes it a virtual certainty that a similar involuntary hand contraction would occur on the strong hand side, as has been repeatedly documented in many incidents over the years. The strength of this contraction would be more than enough to activate the trigger (around 50 lbs. of force in an adult male).

The second possibility is that this negligent discharge appears similar in some respects to the one in California several months ago where a BART transit officer discharged his handgun into the back of a prone handcuffed suspect. In that case, the officer stated he intended to draw and discharge his taser, but inadvertently drew and fired his gun instead. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.

Mistaking a gun for a taser may sound implausible to those who have not had to execute multiple critical tasks during a struggle with a suspect. Having been there a time or two, it doesn't stretch my credulity at all.

In the BART case, the officer had received far more training in firing his handgun than his taser, and the taser holstering system setup on his duty rig was arranged so that both the taser and the handgun would be manipulated by the same hand. The hand functions for drawing and firing both were the same. Under the stress of a struggle, while his mental decision was to draw and fire the taser, the hand assigned to that task performed the more dominant function instilled by training - drawing and firing the handgun.

I suspect a similar sequence of events may have happened in the Plano case, if the officer's statements about his intent are true. In the article, the officer stated that he had no intention of firing his handgun, and no intent to place his finger inside the trigger guard. However, his department had recently issued him a Surefire X300 weapon light with an activation mechanism that he described as located under the trigger guard instead of on the grip, as his previous weapon light switch had been. The only configuration I can find in the Surefire X300 accessory that would match this description is the single frontstrap mounted switch option.. (The full range of accessory options can be seen here.)

Here we have a newly issued piece of equipment that requires a different mode of operation from similar gear the officer was much more familiar with, and a light activation switch that is turned on with rearward pressure applied just under the trigger guard. This switch is designed to be activated by the middle finger on the frontstrap. However, under the stress of a struggle, I can easily see how a decision to execute this brand new and not repeatedly practiced maneuver could result in an officer executing the mechanically similar and very heavily practiced maneuver of pulling the trigger with the trigger finger. This would be especially easy if both factors were in play - a trigger finger already in the trigger guard and a hand squeeze to activate the light that causes a contraction of the trigger finger as well.

I am not privy to details of the Plano investigation, and I cannot make valid judgments on what did or did not happen during the tragic event sequence during an arrest. However, I think there is value in exploring the potential mechanisms and contributing factors that may have come into play here because, whether they did or did not contribute to the tragedy in this most recent case, they most certainly can and have done so in other incidents in the past. Awareness of these possibilities may help some of our members make good equipment selection, training, and planned procedure choices and avoid a similar tragedy in the future.