brianko wrote:Good. Then you'll certainly understand the weaknesses inherent with any predictive method used to generate passwords. Unless we're talking about brute-force attacks,
Errr..We are. That's about the *only* possibility when we're talking about mass automated attacked against public facing systems, from a password guessing perspective. This also, of course, covers attacks against known unsalted hash values using rainbow tables, of course. Or attacks against salted hash values with a known or guessed salt value.
brianko wrote:here is always going to be an element of "social engineering" involved.
??? I think we're getting multiple weaknesses and the attack vectors that can be used to exploit these given weaknesses confused here. The whole point of "social engineering" is to
*completely* eliminate the complexity of the password as an obstacle. If I can convince you to give me your password for a gift (check theregister.co.uk as they've published several articles over the past couple of years on studies, one where the examiners gave out chocolate bars in exchange for passwords and another where they gave coupons, if I recall correctly) or because I convince you that I'm from the IT help desk and I need it (probably the favorite social engineering trick of all time, and one used to great success by Kevin Mitnik) then it doesn't matter at all if your password is your pet's name, or a memorized binary sequence for your 2048-bit RSA private key, because it's game over, regardless.
brianko wrote:A predictive password scheme readily lends itself to an attack once the attacker narrows the choices down. Any scheme that depends upon a personal "token" such as a birthday, pet's names, etc. is an exploit simply waiting to happen.
Yes. That is correct. The point of a pass-phrase is to exponentially increase the keyspace that you have to choose from so that you *don't* have to use a pet's name, or a birthday in order to have a memorable and secure password.
brianko wrote:And any scheme that relies on a predictive method to generate passphrases (such as book passages) simply provides a false sense of security.
Again yes, if you're pitting yourself against determined investigators and a cryptanalyst who is motivated to access your data. Potentially. Depending on how specifically they can pin down where your password might have come from. And there aren't very many of those folks out there. The only places I know of in the US who employ cryptanalysts who actively attack systems are the FBI, the Secret Service, the NSA, and the DoD, in Naval Intelligence and the now apparently stillborn Air Force Cyber-Command.
We certainly both know that security isn't absolute, and I'm sure that we both clearly want to send the same message that you need to pick secure passwords, but in the world of massively parallel processing where billions of brute force password attempts are significantly cheaper than a cryptanalyst's time, a long pass-phrase is considerably more secure than a relatively short "complex" password.