Uvalde School shooting

[Malawler]

I don't care if your an officer 2 days out from retirement and all you have is a revolver, you rush that door and kill the sob!

[Paladin]

Texas House Releases 77-Page Report into Uvalde School Shooting

The report said no one was able to stop the shooter because of what it described as “systemic failures and egregious poor decision making” by people who were either in power our could have been in power to take action.

[Paladin]

Active Shooter Plan
As directed by state legislation enacted in 2019, Uvalde CISD adopted a policy for responding to an active shooter emergency. And Uvalde CISD deserves credit for having done so—they are one of the few Texas school districts recognized by the School Safety Center as having submitted a viable active shooter policy

...With respect to securing doors, the active shooter policy stated:
Staff will conduct inspections of classrooms to make sure doors and windows can be secured … .Doors to all classrooms will remain locked during instruction and the campuses will have one main entry point to the school. Each staff member will know the procedures to follow in order to have any door or window repaired that will not lock.

... In the event of an active shooter incident, the policy expressly provided that upon verification of an active shooter, “the District police department Chief will become the person in control of the efforts of all law enforcement and first responders that arrive at the scene.” The response was to include, if possible, “secur[ing] the administration office as a command post

“[d]uring an emergency the district should coordinate law enforcement, health and medical services with other local first responders
.” The school district’s police department was assigned the responsibility for “the Incident Command Center” and for being “first on scene to prevent or stop an active shooter," while the policy assigned to other “[l]ocal law enforcement and first responders” the function and responsibility to “follow the direction of the ICS leader to ensure proper procedures are followed” and to “[a]ccept assigned roles of ICS leader." Under a section titled “Direction and Control,” the policy laid out a specific “line of succession”:
1. Uvalde CISD police department – Chief Pete Arredondo 2. Uvalde CISD police department – Lt. Mike Hernandez

Before joining the Uvalde CISD Police Department, Chief Arredondo received active shooter training from the ALERRT Center, which the FBI has recognized as “the National Standard ...Every school district peace officer in Texas must be trained on how to respond in active shooter scenarios. Not all of them get ALERRT training, but Chief Arredondo and other responders at Robb Elementary did.

...[t]he initial [law enforcement] responder to arrive at an active shooter scene becomes the Initial Incident Commander by default….”

...Since February 2021, high-speed chases have been a daily event in the Uvalde area, causing Uvalde CISD schools to be secured or locked down frequently, with 47 “secure” or “lockdown” events happening since late February 2022

Multiple witnesses reported to the Committee that people at Robb Elementary commonly left doors unlocked—as did people at all the other Uvalde CISD schools as well

Due to a key shortage, Robb Elementary School substitute teachers often were instructed to use the “magnet system” to circumvent the locks in violation of school district policy. Uvalde CISD Police Officer Adrian Gonzalez testified that when an officer was walking the floors and checking doors, the teachers would notify each other, and they would lock their doors. The officers would speak to the teachers and to their supervisors, and they tried to discourage the use of magnets. Common responses from teachers would include that they did not have a key (particularly in the case of substitute teachers) and that it was just temporary while a child was using the restroom. For some teachers, the inconveniences of keeping up with a key outweighed their perception of the risk of leaving doors unlocked.

At the time of the incident, all the doors in the building had been recently painted. In March 2022, around spring break, school administrators received a report from the teacher in Room 111 that his classroom door was not always locking. According to numerous witnesses who testified before the Committee, the door to Room 111 could lock, although it took some extra effort, and if the door closed softly it might not lock. But the head custodian at Robb Elementary testified that he never heard about any problems with the doors for Rooms 111 or 112, and if he had, he would have created a work order. Robb Elementary maintenance records confirm the lack of any written work order to repair the door for Rooms
111 or 112 during the 2021–22 school year.

[Paladin]

Arnulfo Reyes, the fourth grade teacher in Room 111 stated in an interview that teachers and students in his building widely knew that the door to his classroom frequently did not lock, and he had gotten in “trouble” several times when Uvalde CISD police officers found the door unlocked. He stated that, on multiple occasions, he reported the malfunctioning lock to school administrators, who stated that the request had been turned in. As was the apparent practice among Robb Elementary teachers, Reyes never submitted a work order to repair the door lock for Room 111 himself.
Principal Gutierrez, in her testimony, confirmed that school administration knew about the issues with that door, stating that it was reported around spring break of 2022.

Poverty is not an unfamiliar circumstance in Uvalde—86% of the children in the school district may be economically disadvantaged.
The attacker often wore the same clothing day after day

...By 2021, at age seventeen, the attacker had only completed the ninth grade. On October 28, 2021, Uvalde High School involuntarily withdrew him, citing poor academic performance and lack of attendance.

...He made over-the-top threats, especially towards female players, whom he would terrorize with graphic descriptions of violence and rape.

...His employer fired him after a month for threatening a female coworker, and he fared similarly at his next job at Wendy’s. A coworker there described him as “not a good person” and “troubled,”

Living at home, the attacker had no real expenses and hoarded money, telling acquaintances that he was “saving for something big” and that they would all see him in the news one day. Family members believed he was saving money for his own apartment or car, but clues to his real plans surfaced near the end of 2021. That is when he ordered rifle slings, a red dot sight, and shin guards, as well as the body armor carrier worn in both the video he shared and on the day of the Robb Elementary massacre. Still seventeen at the time, the attacker asked at least two different people to buy guns for him, which they both refused to do. Interviews conducted by other investigators indicate that family members and friends were aware of his efforts to buy guns before he was legally permitted to do so. Finally, the attacker developed a fascination with school shootings, of which he made no secret. His comments about them coupled with his wild threats of violence and rape earned him the nickname “Yubo’s school shooter” on that platform. Those with whom he played games taunted him with a similar nickname so often that it became a running joke. Even those he personally knew in his local chat group began calling him “the school shooter” after he shared pictures of himself wearing the plate carrier he’d bought and posing with a BB gun he tried to convince them was real. None of his online behavior was ever reported to law enforcement, and if it was reported by other users to any social media platform, it does not appear that actions were taken to restrict his access or to report him to authorities as a threat.

The Last Days
While a vague idea for a school shooting appears to have been in the attacker’s mind as early as late 2021, he began to pursue his evil plan in early 2022 after a falling-out with his mother. A blowout argument between them was livestreamed on Instagram, and several members of their family viewed it. Although sheriff’s deputies responded to a call, they made no arrests. Soon afterwards, the attacker left home and moved in with his grandmother, just blocks away from Robb Elementary School. His relationship with his mother never improved. He retained similar antipathy toward his father, who last saw him about a month before the shooting. The father felt his son had no love left for him. He noticed that the attacker had cuts on his own face that appeared to be self-inflicted (something other witnesses had observed on prior occasions), and he claimed he was “doing something” soon. The attacker had moved into his grandmother’s small home, where he had no room of his own and slept on the living-room floor. A few days before the shooting, he confided in an older cousin who was also staying there, telling her that he did not want to live anymore.

...On March 23, 2022, a suspicious person dressed in all black with a backpack was seen canvasing Robb Elementary, but no one ever identified the person.

...Patrons of the store who saw him told a different story in FBI interviews, saying after the tragedy that the attacker was “very nervous looking” and that he “appeared odd and looked like one of those school shooters”; another described his all-black clothing as simply giving off “bad vibes.

...The attacker’s uncle drove him to the gun store twice. He said he did not know they were going to pick up a rifle the first time; the store is connected to a popular restaurant, and the attacker said he was hungry. When he returned with a long box and no food, it was obvious he had purchased a rifle. The Committee has not learned who took the attacker to the gun store on May 18th, but the uncle drove him back on May 20th after the attacker falsely told him he needed to pick up ammunition purchased online.

...The attacker’s grandmother and cousin both told him he could not have a gun in the home, so the uncle agreed to store the first rifle at his house. He believes the attacker snuck it out after staying the night a few days later. The attacker apparently hid the second rifle outside his grandmother’s house until he brought it in the night before the shooting, as he related to an acquaintance by text messages.

...The attacker had no experience with firearms, and based on other investigators’ interviews of friends and family, the shooting was likely the first time he fired one. The uncle recalled the attacker attempting to seat a magazine in the rifle and the magazine repeatedly falling out onto the floor. Internet search history shows the attacker sought out ranges but was unable to get to one that allowed long guns before the shooting.

In the last days before the shooting, the attacker saved news stories and other information about the mass shooting in a Buffalo, N.Y. supermarket on May 19, 2022. He also spent time with his cousin’s son, who attended Robb Elementary. After playing the children’s videogame Roblox, the attacker elicited from him details about his schedule and how lunch periods worked at the school.

Prior to the shooting, the attacker had no criminal history and had never been arrested. He is not known to have espoused any ideology or political views of any kind. Private individuals alone knew the many warning signals.

...Just twenty-eight seconds after the attacker informed her that he had shot his grandmother and intended to “shoot up” an elementary school, the German teenager replied with a single word: “Cool."

[Paladin]

That officer saw children dressed in bright colors in the playground, all running away. Then, at a distance exceeding 100 yards, he saw a person dressed in black, also running away. Thinking that the person dressed in black was the attacker, he raised his rifle and asked Sgt. Coronado for permission to shoot. Sgt. Coronado testified he heard the request, and he hesitated. He knew there were children present. He considered the risk of shooting a child, and he quickly recalled his training that officers are responsible for every round that goes downrange

...Principal Mandy Gutierrez had just finished an awards ceremony and was in her office when she heard Coach Silva’s report over the radio. She attempted to initiate a lockdown on the Raptor application, but she had difficulty making the alert because of a bad wi-fi signal.
She did not attempt to communicate the lockdown alert over the school’s intercom. By phone, she called and spoke with Chief Arredondo, who told her, “shut it down Mandy, shut it down. She told head custodian Jaime Perez to ensure that all the doors were locked

...Although the encounter had begun as an “active shooter” scenario, Chief Arredondo testified that he immediately began to think of the attacker as being “cornered” and the situation as being one of a “barricaded subject” where his priority was to protect people in the other classrooms from being victimized by the attacker.
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know this was a terrible, tragic mistake.

...This “barricaded subject” approach never changed over the course of the incident despite evidence that Chief Arredondo’s perspective evolved to a later understanding that fatalities and injuries within the classrooms were a very strong probability

[Paladin]

Between 11:52 a.m. and 12:21 p.m., the surveillance video shows four different ballistic shields arriving in the building. Importantly, however, only the last shield, furnished by the U.S. Marshals, was rifle-rated. The Committee heard evidence that the rifle-rated shield was the only one that would have provided meaningful protection to officers against the attacker’s AR-15 rifle. The Committee received no evidence that anyone told Chief Arredondo or anyone else on the south side of the building about the arrival of the rifle-rated shield.

ALERRT training teaches that any law enforcement officer can assume command, that somebody must assume command, and that an incident commander can transfer responsibility as an incident develops. That did not happen at Robb Elementary, and the lack of effective incident command is a major factor that caused other vital measures to be left undone. Also, the misinformation reported to officers on the outside likely prevented some of them from taking a more assertive role. For example, many officers were told to stay out of the building because Chief Arredondo was inside a room with the attacker actively negotiating.

Chief Arredondo’s search for a key consumed his attention and wasted precious time, delaying the breach of the classrooms

In total, 376 law enforcement officers responded to the tragedy at Robb Elementary School

[Paladin]

The doors to Rooms 111 and 112 were required to be locked at all times, and in a lockdown, the teachers were supposed to check that they were locked.

A teacher in Room 112 was seen locking her classroom door after the lockdown alert. ii.

The door to Room 111 probably was not locked. The teacher in Room 111 does not recall hearing the lockdown alert. The door required special effort to lock it, and the teacher has no memory of having done so. The attacker apparently did not have to take any actions to overcome a locked door before entering the classrooms. c.

If the door to Room 111 had been locked, the attacker likely would have been slowed for some time as he either circumvented the lock or took some other alternative course of action.

[Rafe]

From the profile and history built about the shooter, I don't see any warning signs there at all, even in the slightest. Do you?

[Paladin]

As I'm reading this report the attacker appears to have spent over $6,000 for the weapons, ammunition, magazines, etc. Even if he saved every take home penny from his two short lived jobs (Report states the first job began in "late 2021" and lasted only 1 month, attack occurred in May 2022) it would have been a stretch to be enough to cover $6,000+.

He had made contact with someone online (Report states Germany) who offered encouragement to do the attack. That's a major flag for me after The British attack on Texas Congregation Beth Israel synagogue

The attacker appears very committed to the attack for a long period of time and with a nickname of "school shooter" both in person and online and with a history of making illegal threats... there is a massive issue here about why he was never brought to account for his previous criminal actions. His clean criminal history was instrumental in acquiring 2 firearms.

This looser wasn't the brightest and it seems to me that he was a failure at everything in life. He totaled the pickup truck after driving it only a few blocks... I still say he had help figuring out how to operate the firearms... I just don't think he could figure it out on his own.

[Paladin]

From the report:

At first, responders from the Uvalde Police Department, including the acting chief of police on that day, Lt. Mariano Pargas, dominated the north end of the building. Lt. Pargas, who was one of the earliest responders, testified that he was never in communication with Chief Arredondo, and that he was unaware of any communication with law enforcement officers on the south side of the building...

He did not coordinate with any of the other agencies that responded, such as the Uvalde Sheriff’s Office and the Department of Public Safety. Lt. Pargas did receive a phone call from the chief of the Uvalde Police, who was out of town on vacation, who called to tell him to set up a command post right away. Lt. Pargas testified that he went to the back of the funeral home to start a command post, that the funeral home provided an office, and that then he went back outside to try to keep up with what was going on. This did not result in the establishment of an effective command post.

Now this: Acting Police Chief During Uvalde School Shooting Placed On Leave After Report Details 'Systemic' Failures

It seems astounding that with the School District Chief and acting city police chief both in the building that no one talked to each other or independently took action.

[philip964]

Every day it just gets worse.

[carlson1]

No one has answered this so I will throw it out one more time. Once the DPS Lieutenant arrived could not the State Police take over and settle this? If that is true then why is Colonel McGraw the top cop running this investigation? Our State Troopers obviously failed. You would not have put 19 Troopers and one DPS Lieutenant on a scene in thr 80’s and them not take over.

Next if the Sheriff is the highest law Enforcement Officer in the County why did the Sheriff’s Office not attempt to take charge?

One of the flaws of the law enforcement system in the US is that each agency is independent and has no authority over other agencies. A city officer is neither above nor below a county officer or a state officer. The general rule is that the first agency on the scene has control over it. Any other officer responding is an assisting officer. There have been many known cases of arguments over which officer is responsible for handling what call, but they are almost always officers saying "Not Me." For example, officers may argue that an accident is in the city limits or in the county, with the county officer saying it is the city officer's jurisdiction and the city officer saying it is not in the city and the county officer has to handle it.

I should point out that these are almost never emergency calls and officers will work as needed to get the emergency handled and then argue about the report being written later.

In the instant case, I don't know whether the Uvalde City Officer was first or the ISD officer was. Either way, other responding officers would not have authority to order anyone to do anything other than when protecting a crime scene and telling them to get out of it. For complex incidents like this, there is a system the feds have produced (ICS) that is supposed to resolve who is in charge and set up a command post to run things. of course, it was designed for disasters like floods or tornadoes, where the incident takes a lot of time and agencies working together to resolve. It was not designed for the short time emergency of a shooting in progress. In theory, the incident should have been handled before there was enough time for a command post to be set up and take over command.

This was a complete breakdown of how a police response should be. I have tried a few times to explain possible causes of how this came to be so messed up, but I truly do not understand it. It truly should have been the first officer on scene handling and giving instructions. I assume some supervisor made the scene from one of the first agencies and that is what led to part of the confusion. If they did not take charge, who will?

As you might be able to tell, I do not believe a true "what happened and why" after action analysis has been done yet. This turned into a political cover-up and blame game too quickly to let the analysis go. ALERRT is who i would trust the most for this normally, but they got talked into doing an investigation first, instead of waiting and analyzing the results of the other investigations and an after action analysis. They were not allowed to consider some of the things that are not politically popular to look at, like why officers are not taking pro-active action. I am hoping they get to go back later and do a better analysis so that we can do training on avoiding this kind of mess up again.

I have one question Steve. Are you telling me when the DPS Lieutenant and the two of the Texas Rangers arrived on scene they could not have taken over?

[K.Mooneyham]

No one has answered this so I will throw it out one more time. Once the DPS Lieutenant arrived could not the State Police take over and settle this? If that is true then why is Colonel McGraw the top cop running this investigation? Our State Troopers obviously failed. You would not have put 19 Troopers and one DPS Lieutenant on a scene in thr 80’s and them not take over.

Next if the Sheriff is the highest law Enforcement Officer in the County why did the Sheriff’s Office not attempt to take charge?

One of the flaws of the law enforcement system in the US is that each agency is independent and has no authority over other agencies. A city officer is neither above nor below a county officer or a state officer. The general rule is that the first agency on the scene has control over it. Any other officer responding is an assisting officer. There have been many known cases of arguments over which officer is responsible for handling what call, but they are almost always officers saying "Not Me." For example, officers may argue that an accident is in the city limits or in the county, with the county officer saying it is the city officer's jurisdiction and the city officer saying it is not in the city and the county officer has to handle it.

I should point out that these are almost never emergency calls and officers will work as needed to get the emergency handled and then argue about the report being written later.

In the instant case, I don't know whether the Uvalde City Officer was first or the ISD officer was. Either way, other responding officers would not have authority to order anyone to do anything other than when protecting a crime scene and telling them to get out of it. For complex incidents like this, there is a system the feds have produced (ICS) that is supposed to resolve who is in charge and set up a command post to run things. of course, it was designed for disasters like floods or tornadoes, where the incident takes a lot of time and agencies working together to resolve. It was not designed for the short time emergency of a shooting in progress. In theory, the incident should have been handled before there was enough time for a command post to be set up and take over command.

This was a complete breakdown of how a police response should be. I have tried a few times to explain possible causes of how this came to be so messed up, but I truly do not understand it. It truly should have been the first officer on scene handling and giving instructions. I assume some supervisor made the scene from one of the first agencies and that is what led to part of the confusion. If they did not take charge, who will?

As you might be able to tell, I do not believe a true "what happened and why" after action analysis has been done yet. This turned into a political cover-up and blame game too quickly to let the analysis go. ALERRT is who i would trust the most for this normally, but they got talked into doing an investigation first, instead of waiting and analyzing the results of the other investigations and an after action analysis. They were not allowed to consider some of the things that are not politically popular to look at, like why officers are not taking pro-active action. I am hoping they get to go back later and do a better analysis so that we can do training on avoiding this kind of mess up again.

I have one question Steve. Are you telling me when the DPS Lieutenant and the two of the Texas Rangers arrived on scene they could not have taken over?

If all of that is accurate, and I have no reason to doubt Mr. Rothstein, then something drastically needs to change regarding that. I was under the impression that the Rangers held jurisdiction anywhere in the state. Is that an inaccurate statement? And I also thought that the Sheriff was the highest LEO in any given county, is that also an inaccurate statement? Seems like there needs to be a long, deep look into the hierachy of law enforcement in this state, clear deliniation of jurisdiction, and laws clearly written to say who is in charge and under what circumstances. Obviously, there would be no need for a Ranger to override a local PD officer during a non-violent, typical traffic stop, just for an opposite example. I'm just talking about during emergency situations such as the vile crime in Uvalde.

[carlson1]

No one has answered this so I will throw it out one more time. Once the DPS Lieutenant arrived could not the State Police take over and settle this? If that is true then why is Colonel McGraw the top cop running this investigation? Our State Troopers obviously failed. You would not have put 19 Troopers and one DPS Lieutenant on a scene in thr 80’s and them not take over.

Next if the Sheriff is the highest law Enforcement Officer in the County why did the Sheriff’s Office not attempt to take charge?

One of the flaws of the law enforcement system in the US is that each agency is independent and has no authority over other agencies. A city officer is neither above nor below a county officer or a state officer. The general rule is that the first agency on the scene has control over it. Any other officer responding is an assisting officer. There have been many known cases of arguments over which officer is responsible for handling what call, but they are almost always officers saying "Not Me." For example, officers may argue that an accident is in the city limits or in the county, with the county officer saying it is the city officer's jurisdiction and the city officer saying it is not in the city and the county officer has to handle it.

I should point out that these are almost never emergency calls and officers will work as needed to get the emergency handled and then argue about the report being written later.

In the instant case, I don't know whether the Uvalde City Officer was first or the ISD officer was. Either way, other responding officers would not have authority to order anyone to do anything other than when protecting a crime scene and telling them to get out of it. For complex incidents like this, there is a system the feds have produced (ICS) that is supposed to resolve who is in charge and set up a command post to run things. of course, it was designed for disasters like floods or tornadoes, where the incident takes a lot of time and agencies working together to resolve. It was not designed for the short time emergency of a shooting in progress. In theory, the incident should have been handled before there was enough time for a command post to be set up and take over command.

This was a complete breakdown of how a police response should be. I have tried a few times to explain possible causes of how this came to be so messed up, but I truly do not understand it. It truly should have been the first officer on scene handling and giving instructions. I assume some supervisor made the scene from one of the first agencies and that is what led to part of the confusion. If they did not take charge, who will?

As you might be able to tell, I do not believe a true "what happened and why" after action analysis has been done yet. This turned into a political cover-up and blame game too quickly to let the analysis go. ALERRT is who i would trust the most for this normally, but they got talked into doing an investigation first, instead of waiting and analyzing the results of the other investigations and an after action analysis. They were not allowed to consider some of the things that are not politically popular to look at, like why officers are not taking pro-active action. I am hoping they get to go back later and do a better analysis so that we can do training on avoiding this kind of mess up again.

I have one question Steve. Are you telling me when the DPS Lieutenant and the two of the Texas Rangers arrived on scene they could not have taken over?

If all of that is accurate, and I have no reason to doubt Mr. Rothstein, then something drastically needs to change regarding that. I was under the impression that the Rangers held jurisdiction anywhere in the state. Is that an inaccurate statement? And I also thought that the Sheriff was the highest LEO in any given county, is that also an inaccurate statement? Seems like there needs to be a long, deep look into the hierachy of law enforcement in this state, clear deliniation of jurisdiction, and laws clearly written to say who is in charge and under what circumstances. Obviously, there would be no need for a Ranger to override a local PD officer during a non-violent, typical traffic stop, just for an opposite example. I'm just talking about during emergency situations such as the vile crime in Uvalde.

I know for a fact in two County’s in East Texas that every time the deputy arrives on scene they take the investigation AWAY from the City Police who will always be on scene first. It has been that ways since the early 90’s and still is that way today. I am not for sure why the SO always do that in these two County’s, but they do. That is why I asked my question. I don’t know what happens in Uvalde.

[G.A. Heath]

In my county if it happens inside city limits the PD assumes control, if it happens outside city limits then the SO assumes control. Most accidents and cases where a conflict of interest may come into play are usually turned over to DPS/Rangers ASAP, and for the interim the nearest PD in the case of the SO and the SO in the case of one of the PDs. This doesn't mean that the agencies don't work cases outside of "their control". If all SO units are busy or too far away then the PDs will respond to calls in the county, and if the PD units are tied up then the SO will respond to calls inside city limits. Once the 'controlling agency' has a unit on scene they assume control of the situation with the first unit from the other agency acting as second in command and/or advisory capacity.

A good example of this was a quadruple shooting that ended up being a double homicide that had two crime scenes. One scene was in the county, and the other inside city limits. The first scene, which had one murder victim and one seriously injured survivor, was inside city limits. The second scene with the other two victims (including the other decedent) was just outside city limits in the county. The PD assumed control of the investigation and response to the shooting. The suspect was located hiding outside his home which was the second scene.

A bad example of this would be a case involving a former coworker who was underage being stalked by an ex-partner who was not underage. The Deputies were handling a complaint by the underage coworker's parents while we had an incident at work that necessitated I contact the law enforcement. Once the PD learned that this was related to a case being handled by the SO they wanted nothing to do with it. Of course with the incident I was dealing with being inside city limits the SO wanted nothing to do with it. In the end I used friendships and knowledge I had to get both a deputy and PD officer to where I work and forced them to deal with the issue under penalty that I would go to the Sheriff and Chief if at least one of them didn't handle the issue I was dealing with. In the end The PD handled my issue and the SO handled their existing investigation which they reportedly requested records from the PD on my issue. I am still good friends with the deputy from that situation, although he is now the police chief for a nearby town and the PD officer is still with the local PD and an even bigger pain in my side now.